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Abstract 
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates heterogeneity in the treatment effects of the Mexican conditional 
cash transfer program PROGRESA using data from its well-known experimental 
evaluation.  In addition to learning more about how PROGRESA affects its eligible 
population, we aim to provide a template for similar analyses of other programs by 
examining in one place a number of different methods advanced in the recent literature 
for learning about the distribution of impacts. 
Studying heterogeneous treatment effects allows us to go beyond the simple mean 
impacts that dominate the literature.  Looking at features of the distribution of impacts 
other than just the mean provides a deeper picture of how a program works and provides 
evidence for or against economic models that imply heterogeneous responses.  Looking at 
subgroup variation in treatment effects allows an evaluation of the efficiency effects of 
actual and potential targeting rules, while estimation of the extent of variation in impacts 
not related to observables indicates the potential for data collection to improve program 
targeting.  Knowledge about how program impacts vary and how they relate to untreated 
outcomes indicates the effects of the program on inequality within the eligible population, 
something that matters in a program, like PROGRESA, that provides transfers equal to a 
non-trivial fraction of untreated income among eligibles.  More prosaically, politicians 
prefer programs that provide small benefits to many while injuring none, information not 
revealed by a narrow focus on mean impacts.  In contrast, serious policy analysts will 
value the opportunity to select among programs, and program designs, based on social 
welfare functions that do not assume full transferability or risk neutrality. 
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 We distinguish between systematic variation in mean impacts across subgroups 
and idiosyncratic variation in treatment effects conditional on any subgroup effects.  
Interactions between the treatment indicator and covariates suffice to estimate the former.  
In contrast, as pointed out by Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), getting a handle on 
the idiosyncratic variation poses a real methodological challenge.  Experimental data (as 
well as observational data adjusted for selection bias) provide the marginal distributions 
of outcomes in the treated and untreated states, but not the joint distribution of these 
outcomes.  Learning about the distribution of impacts and related parameters such as the 
fraction with a positive impact or the impact variance requires knowledge of this joint 
distribution.   
 In this paper we adopt a variety of strategies to learn about the joint distribution of 
outcomes.  We begin with the Fréchet-Höffding bounds, which exhaust the information 
about the joint distribution available from the marginal distributions.  We investigate the 
distributions of impacts implied by the assumption of perfect positive dependence 
between the treated and untreated outcomes.  This assumption allows the interpretation of 
quantile treatment effects as estimates of impacts for different untreated outcome levels; 
that is, it makes them impacts at quantiles rather than on quantiles.  In addition, we 
investigate the quite different assumption made in the random coefficient model of 
independence between impacts and untreated outcomes.  We implement multiple 
approaches to the random coefficient model and we describe and implement tests of both 
identifying assumptions.  Unlike Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) much of our 
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analysis considers systematic and idiosyncratic impact variation together, and we identify 
important subgroup effects in the PROGRESA data.1 
 We study PROGRESA for a number of reasons.  First, the program and its 
experimental evaluation have had a profound influence on policy in Mexico and around 
the world.  Similar programs now exist in a number of other countries in Latin America, 
inspired in large part by PROGRESA’s design and positive evaluation results.   
Second, the design, implementation and economics of the PROGRESA treatment 
suggest the likely importance of heterogeneous treatment effects.  As described later on, 
the program provides payments conditional on school attendance that vary by the age and 
sex of the child.  This heterogeneous treatment should lead to heterogeneous treatment 
effects.  Implementation delays in the delivery of PROGRESA benefits in the treated 
villages should also generate heterogeneous treatment effects, particularly in the earlier of 
the two periods we examine.  More generally, we would expect impacts on consumption 
(as well as children’s school attendance and market work) to vary with household 
composition (including number and sex of adults and of children), initial wealth level, 
and tastes for education.  See e.g. Skoufias and Parker (2001), Schultz (2004), Skoufias 
(2005) and Todd and Wolpin (2006) for more on the economics of PROGRESA. 
Third, the experimental evaluation of PROGRESA provides us with high quality 
data on outcomes of substantive and policy interest and on conditioning variables for a 
large sample of individuals.  Fourth and finally, because of random assignment we can 
                                                 
1 Though we explore a number of alternative approaches to pinning down the joint distribution of treated 
and untreated outcomes, we do not explore all of the interesting alternatives available in the literature.  For 
example, we do not explore the use of copulas, as described in Nelsen (1999) and applied in Brendstrup and 
Paarsch (2007).  Nor do we pursue the Bayesian approach outlined in Tobias (2006). 
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proceed without worries about selection bias; this allows us to focus both our analysis 
and the exposition solely on the issue of impact heterogeneity.  
 Our empirical analysis fits into a small but rapidly growing literature that focuses 
on aspects of program impacts other than just the mean for active labor market and 
education programs.  In addition to Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), who analyze 
the data from the U.S. Job Training Partnership Act Experiment, this literature includes 
the analysis of quantile treatment effects (however interpreted) as in Bitler, Gelbach and 
Hoynes (2006, 2007 and 2008), who look at programs for single parents in the US and 
Canada.  Biddle, Boden and Reville (2004) investigate heterogeneous effects of 
workplace injuries on earnings using a variant of the random coefficient model that we 
apply below to PROGRESA.  In a developing country context, Dammert (2007) 
examines quantile treatment effects in a conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua 
and, in work conducted independently of our own, Chavez-Martin del Campo (2006) 
does the same for PROGRESA. 
 The remainder of the paper has the following structure.  Section 2 describes the 
PROGRESA program, its experimental evaluation and the data used in our analysis.  
Section 3 lays out our econometric framework and Section 4 discusses identification of 
the joint distribution of outcomes.  Section 5 presents bounding estimates and the related 
perfect positive dependence case, while Section 6 investigates subgroup variation in 
mean impacts.  Section 7 considers the random coefficient model.  Section 8 discusses 
the policy implications of our finding and of heterogeneous treatment effects more 
generally while Section 9 concludes. 
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2 Institutions and data 
2.1 The PROGRESA Program 
The PROGRESA program targeted Mexico’s rural poor; under the name Opportunidades, 
it now serves the urban poor as well.  As documented in Skoufias, Davis and de la Vega 
(2001), at the end of 1999 it covered 2.6 million families or about 40 percent of rural 
households and one-ninth of all Mexican families and boasted a budget of about $777 
million or roughly 0.2 percent of Mexican GDP.  As the program and its experimental 
evaluation (described below) have generated a large literature in economics, we focus 
here only on the features directly relevant to our analysis: the targeting / eligibility 
scheme and the PROGRESA treatment.  Skoufias (2005) provides more details about 
PROGRESA. 
The targeting of PROGRESA involved two stages: (1) the selection of the 
localities where PROGRESA operates, (2) the selection of eligible households within the 
selected localities.  PROGRESA operated only in remote localities that met two criteria.  
They had to have at least one primary school and a health center and they had to have a 
high score on a “village marginality index” based on pre-program village level data from 
1997 on the illiteracy rate of household heads, access to basic infrastructure (running 
water, a drainage system, electricity), average housing characteristics (ratio of household 
members to rooms, dirt floor) and the importance of agricultural activities.  Within 
selected villages, household eligibility depended on a “poverty index” based on 1997 data 
on household income and assets.  A cutoff value of the poverty index defined poor 
families eligible for PROGRESA.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of Skoufias (2005), 
PROGRESA had a second round of eligibility determination in July 1999 that expanded 
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the set of eligible households, mainly be increasing the number of elderly poor with no 
resident children.  We define eligibility based on the later, more comprehensive definition 
throughout the paper.  Doing so makes our results comparable over time in terms of 
population covered but also means that roughly one-third of the sample in the first time 
period we examine (see below) did not yet have the PROGRESA budget set. 
 The PROGRESA treatment has two components; taken together they imply quite 
different budget sets for eligible and ineligible households.  The first component consists 
of grants given to families whose children regularly attend grades 3-9.2  The grants vary 
by sex and grade, with higher payments to girls (who traditionally have lower rates of 
school attendance) and grade (to reflect the higher opportunity cost of market work for 
older children).  A cap on the total grant binds for large households and affects their 
incentives at the margin. 
 The second component consists of payments, called the “food cash transfer” to 
eligible households that make regular visits to health centers and participate in health 
talks.  Payment receipt requires one health center visit per year for adults, two to five 
visits per year for pregnant and breast-feeding women and two to seven visits per year for 
infants and children.  Though named and marketed as a means of encouraging improved 
nutrition, households may spend the payments as they like.  In addition to the cash 
payments, the program provides nutritional supplements to under-nourished children and 
infants and to pregnant and breast-feeding women.   
                                                 
2 A child must attend class at least 85 percent of the time for the household to quality for the educational 
grant but failure to do so does not affect eligibility for other program benefits. A complex system of 
verification based on forms completed and signed by teachers and school directors governs the payment of 
the educational grants. 
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 PROGRESA distributes its grants bimonthly (at least in principle).  Payments 
began in May 1998 in the treatment villages, though there may have been delays in some 
cases due to implementation difficulties.  PROGRESA requires beneficiary households to 
withdraw from pre-existing social programs with similar goals and target populations, 
such as Niños de Solidaridad, DICONSA, LICONSA and INI, which continued to serve 
everyone in the control villages.3  These programs comprise an important component of 
the control state, which thus consists of a different (and less generous) system of transfers 
rather than no transfers.   
 
2.2 The experimental evaluation 
The PROGRESA evaluation took advantage of the institutional necessity of staggered 
implementation of the program to randomly assign around 500 villages to either the first 
or the final group to receive the program.  As a result, the control villages receive the 
program about two years after the treatment villages.4  Village level random assignment 
has two key advantages: first, it avoids social unrest that might occur in small villages if 
some received generous transfers and others did not.  Second, it avoids contamination of 
the experimental control group due to within-village spillovers.  Unrest and spillovers 
certainly have the potential to compromise both internal and external validity.   
Within treatment localities, eligible households could receive the PROGRESA transfers 
provided they met the conditions for doing so in terms of child school attendance or 
                                                 
3 Niños de Solidaridad provides educational grants, DICONSA maintains subsidized prices for basic food 
items, and LICONSA provides poor families with free tortillas and subsidizes the price of milk. INI targets 
indigenous people and provides lodging and food or educational grants to students.  Figure 4.1 of Skoufias 
(2005) shows very low benefit receipt rates for these other programs among PROGRESA beneficiaries in 
the treatment villages. 
4 This design raises concerns about anticipation effects in the control villages.  We do not know of any 
evidence on this question. 
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family attendance at health clinics.  The PROGRESA treatment consists of the budget set 
(in terms of time and money) that embodies the conditional transfers.  Thus, even 
treatment group members who do not behave in ways that imply receipt of transfers have 
received the PROGRESA treatment.  Because the treatment consists of a budget set, 
PROGRESA does not raise any issues of treatment group dropout (sometimes called 
partial compliance) as in e.g. Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998).   Over the period 
October 1998 to November 1999 transfers to experimental treatment group households 
averaged about 197 pesos per household per month,5 or about 20 percent of average 
consumption in eligible households.   
 
2.3 Data 
The data from the PROGRESA evaluation consists of repeated observations (panel data) 
for 24,000 households from 506 villages (320 in the treatment group and 186 in the 
control group) from seven states over five rounds of surveys (baseline surveys in October 
1997 and March 1998 and follow-ups in November 1998, June 1999 and November 
1999).  In this paper we use data on consumption from two follow-up rounds, namely 
ENCEL (Encuesta de Evaluacion de los Hogares) of November 1998 and November 
1999 as well as background data (collected prior to the program) from the October 1997 
baseline survey.6  We treat each round as a cross section and restrict our attention to 
eligible households.  We also use data from a time allocation module administered only 
in June 1999.  Appendix A provides additional details about our analysis sample; see 
Behrman and Todd (1999) for evidence on the quality of random assignment. 
                                                 
5 These figures represent 1998 pesos; 197 pesos equal roughly US$20. 
6 We restrict ourselves to two follow-up rounds because no reliable consumption data (our main outcome of 
interest) is collected before November 1998. For the sake of comparison, we focus on the two rounds of 
data collected at the same time of the year, and thus do not present results for the June 1999 round.   
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We use data at the household level and focus primarily on per capita consumption 
as an outcome measure.  We also examine children’s participation in school, in market 
work and in domestic work using the time allocation data.  Appendix A describes the 
construction of our consumption measure and the coding of the child time use indicators 
in greater detail. 
Per capita consumption has the virtue that it neatly summarizes household well-
being in the current period.  Indeed, Deaton (1997) argues for consumption as preferable 
to income as a measure of well-being among poor households because, unlike agricultural 
output, it should remain relatively smooth over time.  Our focus on per capita 
consumption may hide within-household differences in program impacts.  We also have 
stronger expectations of heterogeneous impacts for non-transferable outcomes such as 
schooling than for consumption.  Both of these factors make our analysis of per capita 
consumption more conservative in the sense that they work against finding heterogeneous 
treatment effects.  At the same time, consumption does not have a clear normative 
interpretation; the program goal of getting older children to remain in school, which 
should increase the future consumption of the (dynastic) household by increasing human 
capital, may lower consumption in the current period.  This will occur in households 
where the PROGRESA transfers do not make up for losses in income from market work 
(that also do not get compensated by changes in adult behavior).   In such households, 
expected discounted utility has presumably increased, but current consumption does not 
reflect this.  As a result, current consumption represents an imperfect vehicle for a full-
scale welfare analysis.   
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 The top row of Table 1 presents the mean of per capita consumption in the two 
surveys while the top row of Table 2 presents means of the child time use indicators.7  
The remainder of Table 1 presents means of the background variables that we use as 
conditioning variables and for the analysis of systematic variation in average treatment 
effects. 
 
3 Econometric framework 
We use the notation of the potential outcomes framework for studying treatment effects.8  
In the case of a binary treatment, each individual “i” has two potential outcomes, denoted 
1iY  for the treated outcome and 0iY  for the untreated outcome.  Each individual 
experiences only one of these two potential outcomes; which one depends on his or her 
treatment choice.  This missing data problem, that we cannot observe both the treated and 
untreated outcomes for any single unit, constitutes the evaluation problem.  
Defining a treatment indicator {0,1}iD ∈  allows us to represent the observed 
outcome as 1 0(1 )i i i i iY DY D Y= + − .  In this notation, we may further define the impact of 
treatment on individual “i” as 1 0Di i iY Yβ = − .  The literature focuses on two parameters, the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) in the population, 1 0( ) ( )i i DiE Y Y E β− =  and the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET), 1 0( | 1) ( | 1)i i i Di iE Y Y D E Dβ− = = = .  We assume 
throughout this paper that the assumptions required for data from a randomized 
                                                 
7 We lack a good explanation for the fall in mean consumption from the 1998 survey to the 1999 survey.  It 
occurs in both the treatment group and the control group (see the top row of Table 6 for the control group 
means) and so does not result from the program.  It also does not result from selective attrition; we find the 
same pattern if we look only at households present in both the 1998 and 1999 samples (not shown). 
8 The statistics literature calls this the Rubin Causal Model and talks about causal effects rather than 
treatment effects.  A debate regarding proper citations for the potential outcomes framework enlivens the 
footnotes of many papers; popular choices include Neyman (1923), Fisher (1935), Roy (1951), Quandt 
(1972) and Rubin (1974).  We humbly add Frost (1920). 
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experiment to identify the ATET parameter in the population hold in this context.  This 
includes the assumptions of no equilibrium effects – called the Stable Unit Treatment 
Value Assumption (SUTVA) in the statistics literature – and no randomization bias 
(individuals do not act differently due to the presence of random assignment).9 
 Writing the potential outcomes in linear regression form we have 
 0 0 [( ) ]i Di i i D i Di D i iY D D Dβ β ε β β β β ε= + + = + + − + ,   (1) 
where 0 0( )E Yβ =  and ( | 1)D Di iE Dβ β= = .  The composite error term in square brackets 
in (1) includes the idiosyncratic component of the impact (for treated individuals) and the 
idiosyncratic component of the untreated outcome.  Adding exogenous covariates to the 
model, and allowing both the untreated outcome and the impact to vary with those 
covariates, yields 
  0 ( ) [( ) ]i X i D DX i i Di D DX i i iY X X D X Dβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + − − + ,  (2) 
where we leave implicit the distinction between vectors and scalars.  This formulation 
divides the impact for individual “i” into two components.  We call the first ( )D DX iXβ β+  
the “systematic” component of the impact and the other ( )Di Di D DX iXβ β β β≡ − −?  the 
“unobserved” or “idiosyncratic” component of the impact.  A separate division into 
systematic and idiosyncractic components arises for each vector X. 
 Until very recently, much of the applied literature assumed either a strict common 
effect world, in which Di Dβ β=  for all “i”or a common effects within subgroups world, 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Burtless (1995), Heckman and Smith (1995), Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Bloom 
(2005, 2006) for general methodological discussions of field experiments in labor economics and Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kremer (2006) for a similar discussion in the context of development economics.  
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2007) analyze the equilibrium effects of PROGRESA. 
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in which Di D DX iXβ β β= + .  In the first case, the regression model in equation (1) 
simplifies to 
 0i D i iY Dβ β ε= + + .        (1’) 
In the second case, the regression model in equation (2) simplifies to 
 0 ( )i X i D DX i i iY X X Dβ β β β ν= + + + + .     (2’) 
Heterogeneity in the treatment and heterogeneity in individual circumstances relevant for 
treatment response render the common effect model implausible in many contexts.  In the 
course of our analysis we test the common effect assumption in both of its forms. 
 
4 Identification 
In the usual non-experimental or observational context, the main econometric concern is 
correlation between the unobserved component of the untreated outcome and the 
treatment indicator, conditional on included covariates.  This is the classical selection 
bias problem that arises when individuals select into a treatment in part on the basis of the 
idiosyncratic component of their untreated outcome.  In the PROGRESA context, random 
assignment suffices to eliminate this selection problem as, by construction, it makes the 
treatment indicator independent of all other variables, whether observed or unobserved.  
Moreover, random assignment makes the individual treatment effect unrelated to 
treatment status among the population at risk of random assignment.  Thus, even though 
we can follow Heckman (1996) and think of randomly assigned treatment status as an 
instrument, we do not need to worry about the issues engendered by correlation between 
the instrument and the idiosyncratic component of the impact, as discussed in, e.g. 
Imbens and ngrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) and Heckman and Vytlacil 
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(1998).  Under the assumptions noted above, the data from the PROGRESA experiment 
suffice to identify the ATET. 
 More formally, experimental data identify the two marginal outcome distributions 
1( | 1)F Y D =  and 0( | 1)F Y D = .  These marginal distributions in turn identify the ATET 
as each marginal distribution pins down one of the relevant means.  However, as 
highlighted by Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), experimental data do not suffice to 
identify the joint distribution of outcomes 1 0( , | 1)F Y Y D = or any parameters that depend 
on that joint distribution and not just the two marginals.  Examples of such parameters 
include the percentiles of the distribution of impacts, the impact variance and the fraction 
with a positive impact.   
The intuition here is that the marginals do not fully constrain the joint distribution.  
To see this, consider Figure 1, which shows the treated observations from an experiment 
ranked in order on the left hand side, with ( )jiY  denoting the j
th ordered observation and 
the untreated observations from the same experiment ranked in order on the right hand 
side, using similar notation, under the assumption of a common sample size N in the two 
groups.  Different joint distributions imply a different mapping between the ranks of the 
treated distribution and the ranks of the untreated distribution.  Heckman, Smith and 
Clements (1997) formalize this intuition. 
Figure 1 illustrates two extreme cases that will turn out to have important 
properties in the next section.  The first case, which we call Perfect Positive Dependence 
(PPD), and which the literature sometimes calls rank preservation or rank invariance, 
embodies a rank correlation of one.  In this case, the ranks in the two marginal 
distributions correspond so that, for example, the median outcome in the treated 
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distribution has as its counterfactual the median outcome in the untreated distribution, 
and so on for all other quantiles.  The horizontal arrows embody this case.  This case has 
some economic plausibility, especially for programs expected to have only modest effects 
on most participants.  For example, if we take (very) seriously a “one factor” model, in 
which individuals have one skill and outcomes in both the treated and untreated states 
perfectly reflect that skill, then we obtain the PPD case.  More generally, this case may 
represent a useful approximation in contexts where the one factor model basically holds 
but with some variation added on due to other factors including, but not limited to, the 
program under consideration. 
The second case, which we call Perfect Negative Dependence (PND), embodies a 
rank correlation of minus one.  In this case, for example, the qth percentile of the treated 
outcome distribution has as its counterfactual the (100 - qth) percentile of the untreated 
distribution.  The crossing arrows embody this case.  This case lacks surface plausibility 
as it posits that those who do the best when treated do the worst when not treated and vice 
versa.  This represents an extremely strong form of comparative advantage, and also 
assumes that individuals cannot undo the effects of the treatment; for example, if an 
athlete becomes a clerk and finds out that she has little facility at clerking, it presumes 
that she cannot then go back to athletics.  In our view, this assumption about the joint 
distribution has little relevance to the real world. 
In addition to the two extreme joint distributions just considered, we also devote a 
section to random coefficient models, which identify the joint distribution of outcomes by 
assuming independence between the idiosyncratic components of the program impact and 
of the untreated outcome level.  In the world of equation (1) this amounts to assuming 
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independence of the two components of the composite error term, with the implication 
that the marginal density of 1Y  equals the product of the marginal density of the impacts 
and the marginal density of 0Y .  We consider the empirical plausibility of this assumption 
in the PROGRESA context (and in general) in the relevant section.   
 
5 Non-parametric bounds 
5.1 Statistical theory 
We begin our investigation of heterogeneous treatment effects in PROGRESA by using 
the data to estimate non-parametric bounds on the variance of the treatment effects.  In 
particular, we estimate the bounds due to Fréchet (1951) and Höffding (1940), which we 
henceforth call the “FH” bounds.  The FH bounds represent the solution to a classic 
question in statistics: what information do the marginal distributions of two variables 
contain regarding their joint distribution?  The bounds do not rely on any assumptions 
beyond those required for experimental data to identify the ATET. 
 In the case of continuous random variables, the FH bounds are given by 
  1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
max[ ( | 1) ( | 1) 1,0)] ( , | 1)
                                                                min[ ( | 1), ( | 1)].
F Y D F Y D F Y Y D
F Y D F Y D
= + = − ≤ =
≤ = = (3) 
The FH upper-bound distribution corresponds to the PPD case discussed in the preceding 
section while the FH lower-bound distribution corresponds to the PND case.  As 
discussed in Section 3(c) of Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), for binary outcomes, 
the two bounding distributions put as much or as little probability mass as possible in the 
diagonal elements of the corresponding 2 x 2 table.  Rüschendorf (1981) prove tightness 
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of the bounds and Mardia (1970) proves that the bounding distributions represent valid 
probability distributions. 
Cambanis, Simons and Stout (1976) show that if 1 0( , )k Y Y  is superadditive (or 
subadditive) then the extreme values of 1 0( ( , | 1))E k Y Y D = occur at the two bounding 
distributions.  As 
1 0, 1 0
corr( , )Y Y Y Yρ =  is superadditive, we can bound it using the FH 
bounding distributions.  In addition, because we can write the variance of the impacts as a 
function of 
1 0,Y Y
ρ and the two marginal distributions, as in  
 
0 11 0 , 1 0
var( ) var( ) var( ) 2 var( ) var( )Di Y YY Y Y Yβ ρ= + − ,   (4) 
we can also obtain bounds on var( )Diβ  from the two bounding distributions.  In particular, 
the FH upper bound distribution provides the lower bound on var( )Diβ while the FH 
lower bound distribution provides the upper bound. 
The impacts associated with the PPD correspond exactly to those considered in 
the recent literature on quantile treatment effects.10  However, the two ways of looking at 
the same set of estimates imply very different interpretations.  The quantile treatment 
effect framework makes no assumptions about the joint distribution and simply interprets 
the estimated difference in outcomes as informative about the nature of differences 
between the marginal distributions of outcomes in the treated and untreated states.  Such 
differences do not necessarily represent the impact for any particular individual or group 
of individuals. 
                                                 
10 Lehman (1974) and Doksum (1974) introduced quantile treatment effects into the statistics literature.  
Koenker and Bassett (1978) provide (to our knowledge) their first appearance in the economics literature.   
Recent contributions include Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), Koenker and Billias (2001), Abadie, 
Angrist and Imbens (2002) and Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2006). 
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In contrast, the PPD assumption associated with the FH lower bound means that 
the quantile differences represent impacts for the individuals at the given quantile of the 
untreated outcome distribution.  Put another way, without an assumption about the joint 
distribution, quantile treatment effects estimate impacts on quantiles of the outcome 
distribution; with the PPD assumption, the same procedure identifies impacts at quantiles 
of the outcome distribution and, thereby, the full distribution of impacts. 
 
5.2 Implementation 
We cannot obtain estimates of the parameters of interest that depend on the joint 
distribution of outcomes using the simple procedure implicit in Figure 1 because our 
treatment and control groups differ in size.  Instead, we collapse the marginal outcome 
distributions into percentiles.  For the FH lower bound case, we then simply difference 
the corresponding percentiles to obtain percentile-specific impacts.  In the FH upper 
bound case, we re-order the untreated outcome percentiles from lowest to highest and 
then take differences to obtain percentile-specific impacts.  We obtain the outcome 
correlation directly from the percentiles of the marginal distributions and then use 
equation (4), along with estimates of 0var( )Y  and 1var( )Y  obtained from the individual 
data, to obtain the FH bounds on the impact variance.  Taking square roots yields the 
bounds on the impact standard deviation.  We obtain the fraction with a positive impact 
directly using the percentile-specific impacts associated with each FH bounding 
distribution. 
 We present estimated standard errors based on a standard bootstrap of the entire 
procedure.  That is, we draw bootstrap samples of observations of the same size as our 
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analysis sample, and then repeat the entire procedure just outlined.  As discussed in detail 
in Appendix E(ii) of Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), the actual coverage 
probabilities of bootstrap confidence intervals, constructed based on either the bootstrap 
standard error or the percentiles of the distribution of bootstrap estimates, differ strongly 
from the nominal coverage probabilities when the population value of the variance equals 
zero.  Our problem represents a special case of a more general problem with bootstrap 
confidence intervals and the related statistical tests of nulls corresponding to values at the 
boundary of the parameter space; see e.g. Andrews (2000) for a technical discussion. 
 In our context, even when the null holds, each percentile-specific impact equals 
exactly zero with probability zero.  As a result, the 95 percent bootstrap confidence 
interval constructed using the percentiles of the bootstrap estimates contains zero with 
probability zero.  Thus, a test based on inverting a confidence interval constructed using 
percentiles of the bootstrap distribution will essentially always reject the null, even when 
it holds in the population.  In contrast, confidence intervals based on the standard 
deviation of the bootstrap standard deviation estimates do sometimes contain zero, but far 
too infrequently.  As a result, to obtain a reliable p-value for a test of the null of a zero 
impact variance, we simulate the distribution of the impact standard deviation under the 
null by drawing both treated and control samples from the control group data; Appendix 
B provides the details. 
 
5.3 Estimates 
Table 2 presents bounds on the probabilities of being in school, of working in the paid 
labor market, and of performing domestic labor in the home, where we code each of these 
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as a binary (does it / does not do it) outcome.  The table has three panels, one for each of 
these three outcomes, and six columns, three for boys in each of three age groups and 
three for girls in the same three age groups.  We expect the PROGRESA treatment to 
differentially affect boys and girls and children of different ages given the differential 
payments by grade level and sex and differences in the opportunity costs of schooling.   
 Within each panel, the first row presents the fraction of the treatment group doing 
the activity in that panel and the second row presents the corresponding fraction for the 
control group.  The third row presents the FH bounds on the off-diagonal cells of the 2 x 
2 table corresponding to doing the activity in the treated state and not doing it in the 
control state, while the fourth row presents the FH bounds for the other off-diagonal cell.  
For example, the FH bounds indicate that between 0.02 and 0.40 of boys ages 8-11 would 
attend school when treated but not attend school when not treated, while between 0.0002 
and 0.38 would attend school when not treated but not attend school when treated.  These 
numbers in turn imply that at least 0.21 (= 0.61 – 0.40) and at most 0.59 (= 0.61 – 0.02) 
of this group of boys would attend school regardless of treatment status.  In contrast, for 
secondary school age boys, the lower bound on the fraction who would attend school in 
either state equals 0.00 = (0.12 – 0.12).  A similar pattern holds for girls.  This finding is 
consistent with Todd and Wolpin’s (2006) argument that PROGRESA should target its 
financial incentives relatively more strongly at older children rather than “buying the 
base” of younger children, many of whom would attend school anyway. 
 The mean outcomes and the impacts they imply replicate patterns produced 
elsewhere: for boys, school attendance falls dramatically with age while market work 
rises equally dramatically.  For girls, school attendance again falls dramatically with age, 
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while work in the home rises.  PROGRESA has a modest but not trivial mean effect on 
these outcomes in the intended directions. The loudest lesson from Table 2 is that the 
bounds are not very informative in this context.  In particular, the lower bounds on the 
off-diagonal cells consistently just barely exceed zero, indicating that the marginal 
distributions provide little information beyond that implicit in a binary outcome. 
 Table 3 presents the FH bounds on various parameters related to the distribution 
of impacts for per capita consumption (hereafter just “consumption”) in November 1998 
(the first one or two columns) and November 1999 (the second one or two columns).  The 
first row in the table shows average consumption in the control group, which equals 
201.55 pesos in 1998 and 176.44 pesos in 1999.  The second row shows the mean impact 
estimates, which equal 4.83 in 1998 and 15.79 in 1999.  The next eight rows display the 
5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles of the estimated distribution of impacts followed 
by the fraction with a positive impact, the impact standard deviation and the outcome 
correlation.   
 Ignoring sampling variation, the FH bounds indicate that the impact standard 
deviation lies between 12.21 and 260.90 pesos in 1998 and between 3.01 and 224.02 
pesos in 1999.  The FH bounds show that under the PPD assumption, about 84 percent of 
households in 1998 and 100 percent in 1999 had increased consumption due to 
PROGRESA, compared to only 51 and 54 percent under PND.  Under PPD, in 1999 the 
impact increases with the percentile of the outcome distribution, indicating that those 
with the highest consumption levels without PROGRESA had the largest impacts.  
 The final seven rows of Table 3 present selected quantiles of the simulated 
distribution of the impact standard deviation under the null of a zero impact standard 
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deviation.  Comparing the lower bound on the impact standard deviation to these values, 
we find that we can reject this null at the 10 percent level in the 1998 data.  This finding 
represents very valuable information, which we obtain without imposing any assumptions 
on the data beyond those generally invoked in experimental analyses.  In contrast, we 
cannot reject the null for any reasonable significance level in the 1999 data.  It does not 
follow, of course, that the data do not embody heterogeneous impacts; rather, it means 
that the marginal distributions alone do not imply that they do.  The difference between 
the two years likely results in part from incomplete program implementation in 1998. 
 
5.4 Testing the PPD assumption 
We argued earlier in the paper that while the PND case has little empirical plausibility, 
the PPD does, at least for treatments expected to affect outcomes only modestly.   In this 
section, we test an implication of the PPD assumption using a test developed in Bitler, 
Gelbach and Hoynes (2005).11  Their test formalizes the intuition that if quantiles of the 
untreated outcome represent the counterfactual outcomes for the same quantiles of the 
treated outcome distribution, then exogenous covariates should have the same 
distributions in each quantile of the two outcome distributions.  If we reject the null of 
equal distributions, this represents strong evidence against the PPD assumption; in 
contrast, if we fail to reject the null, it represents only weak evidence in favor of that 
assumption, as equal covariate distributions could also hold for many other joint 
distributions of outcomes. 
                                                 
11 We cite the working paper version here because the test does not appear in the published version, Bitler, 
Gelbach and Hoynes (2008) 
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 We face two main choices in implementing the test.  First, how wide should we 
make the regions over which we test equality of the covariate distributions?  We could do 
a separate test for every percentile, or we could do a smaller number of tests using larger 
intervals such as quartiles.  Doing many tests means low power (due to small sample 
sizes) for each test and also raises important multiple comparisons issues.  On the other 
hand, relying on a small number of tests runs the risk of missing departures from equality 
of distributions within small sub-intervals of the outcome distributions.  We opt to follow 
Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2005) and test equality of means by quartile; as it turns out, 
this suffices to make the point in our data.    
 The results of our tests appear in Table 4.  Each of the four columns of results 
corresponds to one quartile of the marginal outcome distributions from November 1999.  
Each row corresponds to a particular exogenous background variable.  The top value in 
each entry represents the mean difference in the row variable between the treatment and 
control observations in the column quartile.  A 90 percent bootstrap confidence interval 
appears below each estimate.  The bootstrapping takes into account the variance 
component that results from the initial assignment to quartiles. 
 The variables in the table consist of the poverty score and village marginality 
index, characteristics of the household head, and measures of the age and gender 
composition of the children and adults in the household for a total of 21 variables and, 
thus, 84 (= 4 x 21) tests.  Under the assumption of independence of the different tests, we 
would expect about eight or nine rejections (at the ten percent level) in the table under the 
null of no differences in the distributions of covariates between treatment and control 
observations in the four quartiles.  In fact, we obtain 28 rejections, though of course the 
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tests are not independent.  The strongest departures from equality occur for the poverty 
score and for the variables related to the age and gender composition of the children in 
the household.  Our estimates suggest that households with high initial poverty scores 
migrated up the outcome distribution when treated, as did households with a larger family 
size, a larger number of infants and primary school age children and a smaller number of 
older adults. 
 In summary, Table 4 provides some evidence inconsistent with PPD in 1999. This 
result has two consequences for the analysis: (1) the lack of heterogeneity in program 
impacts based on the Fréchet-Hoeffding lower bound cannot be interpreted as lack of 
heterogeneity in actual impacts; and (2) we cannot interpret the quantile treatment effects 
in Table 3 as impacts at particular quantiles of the untreated outcome distribution.  These 
conclusions come with one further caveat: as documented in Behrman and Todd (1999), 
due to village level rather than individual randomization, some differences in mean 
characteristics remain between the treatment and control groups.  These lingering 
differences could contribute to our rejection of the PPD in the 1999 data. 
 
6 Systematic impact heterogeneity 
Most program evaluations include impact estimates for specific subgroups, such as men 
and women and individuals with more or less education.  At the same time, some readers 
criticized the Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) study (correctly) for failing to 
distinguish between systematic subgroup variation in treatment effects and idiosyncratic 
variation in the effect of treatment that remains after removing subgroup variation.  If 
subgroup variation in impacts represents most of the overall variation, then the methods 
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for examining idiosyncratic impact heterogeneity applied in this paper have little practical 
value. 
In this section, we respond to these concerns by first examining the importance of 
subgroup impacts in PROGRESA.12  These subgroup impacts have important 
implications for program design and data collection, as discussed in detail in the policy 
section below.  We then repeat the bounding exercise on the idiosyncratic component of 
the variation in treatment effects that remains after removing the systematic component to 
see if, in the PROGRESA case, we need to worry about idiosyncratic heterogeneity in 
program impacts.  More formally, in terms of our notation we examine whether we can 
statistically distinguish the lower bound on var( )Diβ? from zero. 
 
Systematic variation in impacts by subgroups 
Table 5 presents our estimated subgroup impacts.  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present 
estimates for consumption in November of 1998 and 1999, respectively.  In contrast to 
the common practice in government evaluation reports of examining the subgroups one at 
a time, we estimate equation (2) including interactions between the treatment indicator 
and the household poverty score and village marginality index, variables capturing the 
number and sex of children in the household, (log) household size and characteristics of 
the household head such as sex, age, education and working in agriculture.  The final 
three rows present p-values from F-tests of two null hypotheses: that all of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms equal zero and that all of the coefficients on 
                                                 
12 Skoufias (2005) and Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) also provide some (more limited) subgroup 
impact estimates for PROGRESA.  See Horwitz, Singer, Makuch and Viscoli (1996) for an example of the 
large literature in epidemiology and related fields on the value and interpretation of subgroup impacts. 
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interaction terms other than those for the poverty score and the village marginality score 
and their interaction equal zero.  Although we did not chose our subgroups in advance, 
they all represent obvious choices given the design of the PROGRESA treatment, the 
program’s eligibility rules, the evaluation design, and the population at issue. 
 We highlight three findings from Table 5.  First, in both 1998 and 1999 the 
poverty score and village marginality index, and their product, strongly predict 
differences in the mean treatment effect on consumption.  In both cases, all three 
variables have positive coefficient estimates, indicating larger impacts on consumption 
for poorer households, for households in more marginal villages and particularly for 
poorer households in more marginal villages.  This pattern has important implications for 
program targeting, as we discuss later on.  Second, we find much more subgroup 
heterogeneity in treatment effects in the 1998 data than in the 1999 data; we again 
interpret this, at least in part, as due to the effects of partial program implementation.  
Finally, we can strongly reject the null of zero coefficients on all of the interaction terms 
and, perhaps more surprisingly in 1999, all of the interactions other than those involving 
the household poverty score and village marginality index. 
 
Bounds conditional on subgroup impacts: econometrics and implementation 
We now present estimates of the FH bounds on the impact variance after removing 
subgroup variation in mean impacts.  We obtain our estimates of the FH bounds on 
var( )Diβ? using the residuals from estimating equation (2) in the preceding section.  The 
use of residuals from (2) rather than the observed outcomes constitutes the primary 
difference relative to our procedure in the preceding section.  We also include main 
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effects in the variables we interact with the treatment indicator.  Doing so yields a more 
powerful test via a reduction in the residual variance. 
We approximate the distribution of the FH bounds under the null using 
simulations.  In each simulation, we draw a sample equal in size to the original data set 
from the control group with replacement.  We then estimate (2), obtain the residuals, 
randomly divide the residuals into treatment and control groups in proportion to the 
original data, convert the data into percentiles, and then use the percentiles to estimate the 
FH bounds as described above.  We test the null of a zero idiosyncratic impact variance 
by comparing the estimated FH lower bound on the variance from the real data to the 
distribution of estimates from 100,000 simulations. 
 Our procedure differs from the related test of the same null hypothesis (but with 
different data) presented in Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes [BGH] (2007).  Their test begins, 
like ours, with estimation of (2).  They then use their control group data combined with 
estimated subgroup effects to estimate the outcome distribution under the null of no 
idiosyncratic impact heterogeneity.  Their test statistic consists of the maximum 
difference in percentiles between the treated and untreated outcome distributions.  They 
obtain the distribution of their test statistic using sub-sampling methods, as discussed in 
Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2005).  Analytic and/or Monte Carlo comparison of 
the properties of these two testing schemes (and refinements thereof) represents a useful 
avenue for future research. 
BGH (2007) extend their analysis to take account of point masses at zero in the 
earnings outcome variables they examine; without such an extension, rejection of the null 
follows almost automatically from the fact of point masses at zero in both the treated and 
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untreated states combined with non-zero mean impacts.  As our consumption data 
includes no zeros (or other substantial point masses) we do not require this complication. 
 
Bounds conditional on subgroup impacts: results 
Table 6 presents estimates of the FH bounds on the idiosyncratic impact variance after 
removing the systematic variation in mean impacts.  The two columns present estimates 
for November of 1998 and 1999, respectively.  The first row presents the mean untreated 
outcome, the second the mean systematic impact, the third the standard deviation of the 
systematic impacts and the fourth the percentage with a positive impact based only on the 
systematic impacts.  The mean systematic impact rises from about 0.035 (= 7.11 / 201.55) 
of the untreated outcome in 1998 to about 0.095 (= 16.79 / 176.44) of the untreated 
outcome in 1999.  Based on the systematic impacts alone, 60.75 percent experience an 
increase in consumption in 1998 and 89.98 percent do so in 1999. 
 Rows 5 and 6 of Table 6 give the estimated FH bounds on the idiosyncratic 
impact standard deviation, while the remaining rows give various percentiles of the 
distribution of estimates of the bounds under the null of a zero idiosyncratic variance 
obtained from the simulations.  We find four patterns worth noting.  First, removing the 
systematic variation in impacts leads to surprisingly little change in the estimated FH 
lower bound on the idiosyncratic impact standard deviation, which changes from 12.21 to 
11.47 for 1998 and from 3.01 to 4.74 for 1999.  Second, at the FH lower bound, the ratio 
of the idiosyncratic and systematic impact standard deviations equals 0.068 (= 1.47 / 
21.73) in 1998 and 0.332 (= 4.74 / 14.27) in 1999.  Thus, even in that extreme case, 
important idiosyncratic variance remains.  Third, as in Table 3, we cannot reject the null 
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of a zero idiosyncratic impact variance in 1999 at conventional levels.  Finally, as before, 
we attribute the reduction in the impact variance, both systematic and idiosyncratic, from 
1998 to 1999, as well as the increase in the mean impact, to partial implementation in 
1998.   
  
7 Random coefficient models 
7.1 Motivation 
The broader social science literature commonly assumes independence of the impact and 
the untreated outcome level.  This assumption underlies the random coefficient models 
sometimes used in applied work in economics.  The random effects panel data model 
represents a special case of the random coefficient model, in which only the intercept has 
a random coefficient.  Outside economics, this assumption plays an important role in the 
multi-level models widely used in educational statistics and elsewhere. 
 How plausible is the assumption of independence of impacts and untreated 
outcome levels in the PROGRESA context?  First of all, we have random assignment of a 
budget constraint based on fixed eligibility criteria.  Thus, conditional on eligibility, 
selection into treatment based on expected impacts plays no role here.  On the other hand, 
while all treated units face the PROGRESA budget constraint, not all of them choose to 
receive the subsidy in all periods or for all of their children.  This choice should correlate 
with both the market wages and household productivity of children and thus with levels 
of schooling and consumption in the absence of PROGRESA (and with variables 
correlated with those levels).  In some contexts, arguments that individuals have little 
information on which to base their decisions and so participate more or less at random 
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conditional on eligibility might justify the random coefficient model, but such arguments 
lack plausibility here in regard to take-up of the subsidy as individuals will already have a 
sense of their children’s payoff from schooling and their opportunity cost in domestic 
production or market work.   
Thus, overall, we view the a priori case for the random coefficient model in the 
PROGRESA context as mixed at best, though it becomes more plausible once we remove 
the systematic variation in impacts.  Thus, we analyze it in part because we think it has 
some plausibility in the latter case and in part because of our desire to provide a template 
for future work in other contexts, some of which may provide greater a priori support for 
the random coefficient model. 
 
7.2 Econometrics 
The literature provides a variety of estimators for the random coefficient model; they 
differ mainly in the amount of structure imposed on the impact distribution.  We proceed 
in three steps.  In the first step, we impose only the independence assumption.  This 
allows us to estimate the impact variance and perform tests on the impact variance, but 
does not suffice to identify the full distribution of impacts.  Under this assumption, in 
model (1) we can estimate the impact variance as  
1 0var( ) var( ) var( )Di Y Yβ = − .      (5) 
Nothing in the data constrains the sign of this difference; which therefore provides a 
crude test of the random coefficient model.  Assuming a normal distribution for the 
impacts, as in the Hildreth and Houck (1968) estimator but without, in our case, doing the 
ML estimation, then allows estimation of the fraction with a positive impact.  We make 
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the same point in two additional ways by performing Breusch-Pagan and likelihood ratio 
tests for groupwise heteroscedasticity (which in this case means different residual 
variances in the treated and untreated samples); Wooldridge (2001) and Judge, Griffiths, 
Hill, Lutkepohl and Lee (1985) (and many others) describe these tests.   
In the second step, we again decompose the impacts into systematic and 
idiosyncratic components by estimating (2) as in the preceding section.  Statistically and 
substantively significant coefficients on interaction terms for variables correlated with the 
untreated outcome (which means all of them in our case) represent a rejection of the 
independence assumption for the model without covariates.  This second scheme relies on 
the weaker (and more plausible) assumption of independence between the idiosyncratic 
component of the impacts and the untreated outcomes. 
We then use the residuals from this regression to calculate the impact variance 
under independence as the difference between the variance of the treatment group 
residuals and the variance of the control group residuals.  We calculate the variance 
(across persons) of the systematic component of the impact by constructing the estimated 
systematic component of the impact for each observation and then taking their variance.  
This procedure will somewhat overstate the population variance in the systematic 
component of the impacts due to the presence of estimation error in the estimated 
systematic component for each observation. 
 In the third step, we apply a recent estimator developed by Biddle, Boden and 
Reville (2004) that restricts the distribution of random coefficients to come from the 
Pearson family of distributions.  The Pearson family includes the normal, chi-square, beta 
and gamma distributions as special cases.  Though it allows for only one mode it includes 
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bell-shaped curves as well as J-shaped or U-shaped curves; see e.g. Kendall and Stuart 
(1963) for details.  Though still a non-trivial assumption, this model substantially relaxes 
the normality assumption of the standard model.  The Biddle et al. (2004) estimator relies 
on the first four moments of the treated and untreated outcome distributions to identify 
the particular member of the Pearson family relevant to a given data set under the random 
coefficient assumption.  Their paper considers the more general case of observational 
data; we implement a simpler version (with no first stage nearest neighbor matching of 
treated and untreated units) given our access to experimental data.  The appendix in 
Biddle et al. (2004) derives the first four moments of Diβ  from the first four moments of 
1Y  and 0Y  under the independence assumption.  The first four moments of Diβ  uniquely 
identify a particular Pearson family member. 
Finally, we do not undertake deconvolution as in Heckman, Smith and Clements 
(1997) or Wu and Perloff (2006) because its complexity and related absence from 
standard software packages makes it unlikely to see much use in applied work. 
    
7.3 Results and discussion 
The first row of Table 7 presents estimates of the impact standard deviation obtained by 
taking the square root of the difference in the variance of the treated and untreated 
outcomes.  Based on the bootstrap standard errors, we can easily reject the composite null 
of a non-positive variance in both 1998 and 1999.  The estimate equals 53.17 in 1998 and 
34.12 in 1999.  To put this in context, note that transfer payments under the program 
averaged about 200 pesos per month, and recall from Table 3 that the mean impacts equal 
4.83 and 15.79 pesos per month.  The estimated impact standard deviations from the 
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
simple random coefficient model lie well within the FH bounds (another test) and 
substantially exceed the lower bound values. 
The next two rows in Table 7 display results from Breusch-Pagan and LR tests of 
heteroskedasticity as a function of treatment status.  These tests support the inference 
based on the estimated impact standard deviation as we can strongly reject the null of 
homoskedasticity and thus the null of a zero impact variance for both tests in both years.   
The fourth row of Table 7 presents the estimated fraction with a positive impact 
under the assumption that the impacts have a normal distribution, which equals 0.55 in 
1998 and 0.68 in 1999.  As in the PPD case, this fraction turns out higher in 1999 than 
1998, which again likely reflects the delayed implementation. 
 The fifth and sixth rows of Table 7 present the estimated standard deviations of 
the systematic and idiosyncratic impacts from model (2) under the independence 
assumption, while the seventh row gives the standard deviation of the overall impacts in 
this model.  Because the presence of systematic impacts leads us to reject the simple 
random coefficient model, the overall impacts from the random coefficient model based 
on (2) need not have the same variance as those from the model without covariates.  We 
find substantial systematic and idiosyncratic impact variance components, with the 
idiosyncratic component the larger of the two empirically, as well as a larger overall 
impact variance here than in the unconditional case. 
 Application of the estimator in Biddle et al. (2004), which imposes independence 
but relaxes the normality assumption in favor of membership in the broad Pearson family 
of distributions, leads to a Pearson Type I (Beta) distribution in 1998 and a Pearson Type 
IV distribution in 1999.  Figure 2 displays the estimated distribution of impacts for 
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November 1998 and Figure 3 presents the corresponding figure for 1999.  We highlight 
two findings from this analysis.  First, both distributions imply no negative impacts on 
consumption, unlike what we found under the PPD assumption or the random coefficient 
model with normality.  Instead, they feature small impacts for many along with a long tail 
of larger positive impacts.  Second, and perhaps most importantly, the distributions 
obtained from the Biddle et al. (2004) procedure differ quite strongly from the normal 
distribution commonly assumed in applications of the random coefficient model.  Our 
results suggest the value of frameworks that relax the normality assumption. 
 
8 Policy  
We discuss the policy implications of our analyses under four headings: what policies to 
undertake (e.g. should there be a program like PROGRESA), how best to design a policy 
(e.g. how should the conditional transfers in PROGRESA vary with age), who should 
policies target (e.g. who should be eligible for PROGRESA) and how best to evaluate 
policies.  We consider each heading in turn. 
 The standard model of policy evaluation focuses, essentially, on changes in GDP 
between a world with and without a particular program.  As discussed in Heckman and 
Smith (1998) this approach presumes that institutions exist such that policy winners 
compensate policy losers so as to make any policy that increases GDP Pareto improving. 
Of course, in practice such transfers often do not take place, or take place only in part or 
via inefficient in-kind transfers, as under the U.S. Trade Adjustment Act designed to 
compensate those who lose their jobs due to foreign competition.   
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In a world without complete compensation, a program with negative impacts for 
some individuals may increase GDP but not yield a Pareto improvement.  As a result 
policymakers may want to take into account the number of policy losers and the size of 
their losses in addition to overall effects on GDP in choosing among alternative polices.  
More generally, policymakers may care about the entire distribution of impacts, whether 
positive or negative, due to concern about equity between and within groups or for crude 
political reasons.  Our paper outlines and applies a variety of different methods for 
estimating the extent of impact heterogeneity and, more narrowly, the number made 
worse off by a program and the extent of their losses and so provides a template for 
similar analyses in other policy contexts.   
In the narrower context of PROGRESA our analyses add value to the existing 
literature in (at least) three ways, but fall short of a full social welfare analysis 
incorporating heterogeneous impacts on all outcome variables of interest.  First, our 
estimate of the FH bounds on the impact variance, combined with our rejection of the 
PPD assumption, together suggest the importance of heterogeneous impacts on 
consumption.  These impacts embody a direct effect that increases consumption via the 
transfer payments and an indirect effect that reduces consumption via withdrawal of 
children from the paid labor force in favor of school attendance.  Combined with 
heterogeneous impacts on schooling (implied by the fact that not all eligible families 
receive the transfer but school enrollment increases), our findings strongly imply 
heterogeneous welfare effects at the household level.  Second, all of the models we 
estimate indicate at least half of the treatment group saw increased consumption, and 
most yield much higher fractions.  These results suggest that only a modest minority of 
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households experience reduced consumption as a result of responding to PROGRESA’s 
incentives to remove children from the labor market and send them to school.  Third, we 
present new subgroup impacts that reveal important variation in impacts by household 
poverty level, village marginality index and their interaction.  Our estimates suggest that 
expanding the program to richer villages and/or better off households will yield smaller 
impacts on consumption at the margin. 
 Our work has little to say about the design of conditional cash transfer programs 
such as PROGRESA.  The nature of the experiment, which included only one treatment 
arm, means that doing so requires a structural analysis along the lines of Todd and 
Wolpin (2006).  Such an analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Our findings regarding heterogeneity in program impacts have much to say about 
how to target programs in general and also about targeting in PROGRESA in particular. 
By targeting we have in mind both the use of simple eligibility rules, e.g. household 
income less than some value, and more complex statistical treatment rules, as in the U.S. 
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services System analyzed in Black, Smith, Berger 
and Noel (2003).  Targeting of social programs has occasioned much discussion in recent 
years in the policy literature.13 
From an efficiency standpoint, optimal program allocation means assigning 
program eligibility to those with the largest impacts of participation net of costs.  
Although we have not combined our impacts on schooling, market work and 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Berger, Black and Smith (2001), Eberts, O’Leary and Wandner (2002) and Schuck and 
Zeckhauser (2006) for general discusses of targeting and Behnke, Frölich and Lechner (2007) for an 
evaluation of targeting in the context of Swiss active labor market policy.  Manski (2005) and his related 
papers discuss statistical treatment rules at a higher conceptual and technical level.  
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consumption with one another or with impacts on other outcomes such as nutrition14 into 
a single net impact estimate, and also do not take account of program costs, our finding of 
substantial heterogeneity in impacts based on observable characteristics suggests the 
potential for substantial efficiency gains from more finely tuned targeting of ROGRESA 
eligibility.  Moreover, our evidence on idiosyncratic impact heterogeneity that remains 
after removing a substantial amount of systematic heterogeneity hints at the possibility 
for efficiency gains from targeting based on variables not included in our analysis. 
Finally, many governments have no formal policy on when and how they will 
evaluate programs, an important omission in our view.  Our analysis provides one 
additional piece of evidence regarding the high value of experimental evaluations of 
important policies that combine thoughtful design, careful implementation, high quality 
data collection and large sample sizes.  Not only do such evaluations provide convincing 
mean impact estimates overall and for subgroups of interest, they also provide the 
foundation for valuable additional research on program design, impacts (as in our work) 
and on the population served by the program.  In the particular context of PROGRESA, 
our finding of remaining heterogeneity in impacts even after removing systematic 
variation suggests the value of digging deeper into the economics and institutions when 
evaluating similar programs so as to collect variables that will capture this variation.  Our 
results also highlight the value of longer term data collection, as our analysis of the 1998 
data suffers from a lack of external validity due to unanticipated delays in program 
implementation.  
 
 
                                                 
14 See Djebbari (2004) for an analysis of PROGRESA’s impact on household nutrition. 
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9 Concluding remarks 
Our paper lays out a variety of methods for examining heterogeneity in program impacts 
by estimating bounds on, or making additional assumptions about, the joint distribution 
of treated and untreated outcomes.  We also present and apply methods for testing some 
of these assumptions.  Our analysis includes an alternative to the BGH (2007b) method 
for examining the importance of idiosyncratic impact heterogeneity after taking account 
of systematic heterogeneity based on observables. We apply these methods to the data 
from the recent PROGRESA evaluation.    
 The preceding section highlighted the policy relevance of our analysis and 
empirical findings.  More generally, we have tried to integrate and augment the recent 
literature on heterogeneous treatment impacts as a way of providing a foundation for 
future analyses along these lines.  We have shown the value of going beyond the widely 
used random coefficient model with normality of the impact distribution, to consider both 
other assumptions and more flexible versions of the random coefficient model.  Careful 
thinking about heterogeneous treatment effects, and their formal integration into program 
evaluation, represents a profound (and as yet incomplete) departure from earlier practice.  
We intend our paper to speed that departure and thereby hasten the arrival of deeper, 
more relevant and more useful program evaluations. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A-1: Sample information – consumption analysis 
 
 November 1998 November 1999 
Number of households 
randomly assigned 
24,073 22,116 
Number of eligible 
households randomly 
assigned 
18,743 17,293 
Number of eligible 
treatment group households 
11,585 10,475 
Number of eligible control 
group households 
7,158 6,818 
Number of survey 
completers lost due to item 
non-response on items used 
in our analysis 
2,279 2,863 
Treatment group analysis 
sample representation ratea 
87.72% 84.23% 
Control group analysis 
sample representation rateb 
88.02% 82.22% 
aEquals the number of eligible treatment group households in our analysis sample divided 
by number of eligible treatment group households; bEquals the number of eligible control 
group households in our analysis sample divided by number of eligible control group 
households. 
 
Table A-2 Sample information – time use analysis 
 
 June 1999 
Number of children randomly assigned 37,977 
Number of eligible children randomly 
assigned 
31,438 
Number of eligible treatment group 
children 
19,327 
Number of eligible control group children 12,111 
Number of survey completers lost due to 
item non-response on items used in our 
analysis 
3,345 
Treatment group analysis sample 
representation ratea 
89.01% 
Control group analysis sample 
representation rateb 
89.10% 
aEqual to number of eligible treatment group children in our analysis sample divided by 
number of eligible treatment group children; bequal to number of eligible control group 
children in our analysis sample divided by number of eligible control group children. 
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Details on the construction of the per capita consumption outcome 
Per capita consumption is the average consumption in the household over all its 
members.  It is comprised of food and non-food consumption.  Food expenditures include 
household level data on food outlays made in the seven days preceding the interview for 
36 food items.  The value of food consumed from own production in that same period of 
time is added to food outlays to obtain the value of food consumption.  Food consumed 
from own production is valued by imputing a locality level price (base on interviews with 
local leaders in each village).  Non-food expenditures are expenses reported on a weekly, 
monthly and semi-annual basis.  Non-food expenses reported on a weekly basis include 
transportation and tobacco. Monthly outlays include school tuition, health-related 
expenses, home cleaning, electricity and home fuel expenditures.  Expenditures reported 
on a semi-annual basis include home and school supplies, clothes, shoes, toys and 
payments for special events.  The value of consumption is computed as the sum of non-
food expenditures and the value of food consumption.  
 
Details on the construction of the time use indicators 
We classify children’s activities in three categories, namely schooling activities, income-
generating (“work” in Table 2) activities and domestic activities, using a detailed module 
on time allocation.  Income-generating activities are all activities involving work outside 
the house, including wage labor (for an employer, on one’s own firm/farm with salary or 
other paid casual work) and non-wage labor (as an aide, on one’s own firm/farm and 
other non-paid casual work).  Domestic activities include all activities that take place at 
home and that could have been performed by someone hired by the household, such as 
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cleaning the house, washing, sewing and ironing clothes, shopping for the household, 
preparing meals and washing dishes, fetching water or wood, disposing of garbage, 
taking care of animals and fields, looking after children (including taking them to school), 
or looking after elderly or sick people.  Schooling activities consist of attendance at 
school and time spent studying outside the classroom. 
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Appendix B  
Details of the Algorithms Used in the Paper 
 
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Frechét-Höffding Bounding Distributions 
 
Bootstrap standard errors are obtained in the following manner: 
1. Sample with replacement from the actual data (including both the treated and 
untreated observations) 1000 times, indexing each sample by b = 1,…,1000. 
2. For the bth bootstrap sample:  
a. Collapse the D = 0 and D = 1 distributions into percentiles. 
b. Match the percentiles in ascending order, compute differences across 
percentiles to obtain the impact distribution in the perfect positive 
dependence case then compute the percent positive, the impact standard 
deviation and the outcome correlation. 
c. Match percentiles in descending order, compute differences across 
percentiles to obtain the impact distribution in the perfect negative 
dependence case, then compute the percent positive, the impact standard 
deviation and the outcome correlation. 
3. The bootstrap standard error is the standard deviation of the statistics from steps 
2b and 2c. 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation procedure for testing the null of a zero impact variance 
proceeds as follows: 
1. Sample with replacement from the control group sample in order to obtain a 
sample of size identical to the total (treatment and control) sample size for each 
survey round. 
2. For each Monte Carlo sample: 
a. Randomly sort the data 
b. Let n denote the treatment group sample size in the actual data.  Assign n 
observations to a synthetic treatment group D* = 1 and N – n observations 
to a synthetic control group D* = 0. 
c. Add the average impact value to each outcome of the D* = 1 group. 
d. Collapse the D* = 1 and D* = 0 outcome distributions into percentiles.  
e. Take the differences across percentiles and compute the standard deviation 
of these differences. 
3. For all Monte Carlo samples: 
a. Sort the 100,000 samples in ascending order based on the standard 
deviation from step 1e. 
b. Use the relevant percentiles of the simulated distribution of impact 
standard deviations under the null to calculate the p-value for the test. 
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Table 4: Treatment-Control Differences at Quantiles of the Outcome Distribution 
 
We obtain confidence intervals for the treatment-control differences in mean outcomes at 
particular quantiles of the outcome distributions under the null of no population 
differences as follows:  
 
1. Obtain a bootstrap treatment group sample by sampling with replacement from 
the treated observations.  Obtain a bootstrap control group sample by sampling 
with replacement from the untreated observations.  Combine the bootstrap 
treatment group and bootstrap control group into a full bootstrap sample.  Repeat 
1000 times, indexing the bootstrap samples by b = 1,…,1000. 
2. For each bootstrap sample b: 
a. Randomly sort the data. 
b. Let n denote the treatment group sample size in the actual data.  Assign n 
observations to a synthetic treatment group D* = 1 and N - n observations 
to a synthetic control group D* = 0 group. 
c. Compute the mean of each observable characteristic for each quantile 
group of the synthetic treatment group outcome. Do the same for each 
quantile group of the synthetic control group outcome. Take the difference 
in these means. 
3.  For each characteristic and quantile group: 
a. Sort the 1000 samples in ascending order based on the differences in 
means for each characteristic and quantile group. 
b. Construct a confidence interval under the null that the difference in means 
for the quantile group is equal to zero by taking the relevant percentiles of 
the sorted values.   
4. Using the actual treatment and control groups, compute the difference in means of 
observable characteristics for each quantile group as in step 2c.  Compare the 
differences from the actual data to the confidence intervals to determine statistical 
significance.  
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Table 6: Estimates Including Systematic Impact Heterogeneity 
 
The bootstrap standard errors are obtained as follows: 
 
1. Sample with replacement from actual data (including both experimental groups) 
1000 times, indexing each sample by b = 1,…,1000. 
2. For the bth bootstrap sample:  
a. Regress the outcome on a treatment indicator, the observable 
characteristics and interactions between the treatment indicator and each 
of the observable characteristics, including a triple interaction term 
between the household poverty score, the marginality index and the 
treatment indicator. Compute the average systematic impact and 
systematic impact standard deviation. 
b. Obtain the residuals from this regression.  
c. Collapse the D = 0 and D = 1 distributions of residuals into percentiles. 
d. Match percentiles in ascending order, compute differences across 
percentiles to obtain the impact distribution in the perfect positive 
dependence case and then compute the impact standard deviation. 
e. Match percentiles in descending order, compute differences across 
percentiles to obtain the impact distribution in the perfect negative 
dependence case and then compute the impact standard deviation. 
3. Compute bootstrap standard errors using the sample of statistics from steps 2d and 
2e.  
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Table 7: Estimates from Random Coefficient Models 
 
The bootstrap standard errors are obtained using 500 bootstrap replications.  Details of 
the procedure for each statistic follow: 
 
1. Bootstrap standards error of the impact standard deviation and the fraction with a 
positive impact in the case with no interactions: 
a. Sample with replacement from the actual data 500 times, indexing each 
sample by b = 1,…,500. 
b. For the bth sample: 
i. Estimate the average impact on the outcome of interest by OLS by 
regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator and a set of 
covariates. 
ii. Square the predicted residuals from the regression.  Regress the 
squared residuals on the treatment variable.  The square root of the 
estimated coefficient is an estimate of the impact standard 
deviation for the bth sample. 
iii. Using the average impact from step (i) the impact standard 
deviation from step (ii) and standard normal random numbers, 
estimate the fraction with a positive impact for a normal 
distribution with a mean equal to the average impact and the 
corresponding standard deviation. 
c. The bootstrap standard errors of the impact standard deviation from step 
(ii) and the fraction with a positive impact under normality from step (iii) 
are given by the standard deviation of these values from the bootstrap 
samples. 
 
2. Bootstrap standard error for the systematic impact standard deviation: 
a. Sample with replacement from the actual data 500 times, indexing each 
sample by b = 1,…,500. 
b. For the bth sample: 
i. Regress the outcome on the treatment indicator, a set of covariates 
and interactions between the treatment indicator and the covariates 
and then predict the systematic impact for each sample member 
using the estimated coefficients. 
ii. Compute the standard deviation of the systematic impacts.  
c. The bootstrap standard error is the standard deviation of the statistics from 
(ii). 
 
3. Bootstrap standard error for the idiosyncratic impact standard deviation: 
a. Sample with replacement from the actual data 500 times, indexing each 
sample by b = 1,…,500. 
b. For the bth sample: 
i. Regress the outcome on the treatment indicator, a set of covariates 
and interactions between the treatment indicator and the covariates. 
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ii. Square the predicted residuals and regress the squared residuals on 
the treatment indicator.  The square root of the estimated 
coefficient is an estimate of the idiosyncratic impact standard 
deviation for the bth sample. 
c. The bootstrap standard error is the standard deviation of the statistics from 
(ii). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 November 1998 November 1999 
 
Monthly average per capita consumption 
204.47 
(149.73) 
186.07 
(127.91) 
 
Assigned to treatment group 
.6172 
(.4860) 
.6115 
(.4874) 
1997 household poverty score 
-696.42 
(117.58) 
-695.17 
(116.78) 
1997 village marginality index 
.4785 
(.7562) 
.4787 
(.7369) 
Household size 
5.89 
(2.69) 
5.93 
(2.68) 
Number of children less than 2 years old 
.51 
(.76) 
0.51 
(0.76) 
Number of children 3-5 years old 
.55 
(.72) 
0.55 
(0.72) 
Number of children 6-10 years old 
1.11 
(1.13) 
1.13 
(1.13) 
Number of boys 11-14 years old 
0.34 
(0.59) 
0.35 
(0.59) 
Number of girls 11-14 years old 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
Number of boys 15-19 years old 
0.34 
(0.61) 
0.34 
(0.62) 
Number of girls 15-19 years old 
0.32 
(0.59) 
0.33 
(0.60) 
Number of men 20-34 years old 
0.50 
(0.62) 
0.49 
(0.61) 
Number of women 20-34 years old 
0.55 
(0.59) 
0.55 
(0.59) 
Number of men 35-54 years old 
0.44 
(0.51) 
0.45 
(0.51) 
Number of women 35-54 years old 
0.45 
(0.51) 
0.45 
(0.51) 
Number of men at least 55 years old 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
Number of women at least 55 years old 
0.26 
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.47) 
Male head of household 
0.89 
(0.31) 
0.89 
(0.30) 
 
Head is an agricultural worker 
.6244 
(.4842) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
Head's education (in years) 
2.69 
(2.68) 
2.70 
(2.66) 
Head is indigenous 0.38 0.38 
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(0.48) (0.48) 
Age of head 
46.47 
(15.89) 
46.54 
(15.77) 
Number of observations 16,464 14,430 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Fréchet-Höffding Bounding Distributions 
 
 Nov. 98 Per Capita Consumption Nov. 99 Per Capita Consumption 
Average 
untreated 
outcome 
(standard 
deviation) 
201.55 
(144.17) 
176.44 
(125.82) 
Average impact 
(standard error) 
4.83 
(2.39) 
15.79 
(2.17) 
Statistic 
(Bootstrap SE) 
Perfect positive 
dependence 
Perfect negative 
dependence 
Perfect positive 
dependence 
Perfect negative 
dependence 
5th percentile 2.27 
(1.29) 
-413.64 
(7.77) 
10.09 
(1.23) 
-342.79 
(6.95) 
25th percentile 4.67 
(1.35) 
-131.02 
(2.48) 
15.98 
(1.27) 
-98.76 
(2.16) 
50th percentile 5.46 
(1.90) 
3.56 
(2.00) 
16.38 
(1.84) 
14.47 
(1.86) 
75th percentile 1.83 
(3.79) 
131.07 
(1.93) 
17.11 
(3.03) 
126.01 
(1.58) 
95th percentile -7.07 
(8.88) 
377.79 
(3.62) 
22.79 
(10.92) 
343.97 
(4.35) 
Fraction positive 0.84 
(0.001) 
0.51 
(0.284) 
1.00 
(0.001) 
0.54 
(0.286) 
Impact standard 
deviation  
12.21  
(4.28) 
260.90 
(1.02) 
3.01 
(3.41) 
224.02 
(0.86) 
Outcome 
correlation 
0.9973 
(0.003) 
-0.6031 
(0.004) 
0.9997 
(0.003) 
-0.6156 
(0.005) 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.50 5.58 5.62 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.40 6.38 6.46 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.30 7.35 7.51 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.20 8.67 8.86 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.10 10.77 10.93 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.05 12.67 12.89 
Cutoff value for 
p=0.01 16.46 16.59 
Note: Cut-off values are from the distribution of the impact standard deviation statistic 
under the null of no variance in impacts. Details on the bootstrap and Monte Carlo 
simulations are given in Appendix B. 
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 Table 4: Treatment-Control Differences at Quantiles of the Outcome Distribution 
 0-25th quantile25-50th quantile50-75th quantile 75-100th quantile
Household poverty score -16.038* 11.311* 18.749* 28.176* 
 [-5.943; 6.510] [-6.492; 5.835] [-6.077; 5.967] [-6.842; 6.543] 
Village marginality index -0.262* -0.030 0.027 0.017 
 [-0.040; 0.043] [-0.039; 0.042] [-0.043; 0.038] [-0.040; 0.037] 
Head is an agricultural worker -0.011 -0.007 0.015 -0.008 
 [-0.025; 0.026] [-0.028; 0.026] [-0.028; 0.026] [-0.029; 0.026] 
Male head of household -0.003 -0.009 0.019* 0.008 
 [-0.015; 0.015] [-0.015; 0.016] [-0.017; 0.016] [-0.022; 0.020] 
Head's education (in years) 0.282* -0.023 0.127 -0.074 
 [-0.137; 0.143] [-0.156; 0.150] [-0.159; 0.158] [-0.155; 0.156] 
Indigenous head -0.099* 0.024 0.044* 0.024 
 [-0.029; 0.029] [-0.028; 0.030] [-0.027; 0.027] [-0.026; 0.025] 
Household size -0.092 -0.025 0.190* 0.111 
 [-0.145; 0.142] [-0.149; 0.142] [-0.137; 0.138] [-0.133; 0.139] 
Head's age 0.207 -0.935* -1.197* -1.318* 
 [-0.803; 0.713] [-0.855; 0.852] [-0.904; 0.890] [-1.015; 1.015] 
Children less than 2 years old 0.040 0.045* 0.049* 0.014 
 [-0.053; 0.050] [-0.047; 0.043] [-0.043; 0.039] [-0.030; 0.031] 
Children 3-5 years old -0.074* 0.050* 0.029 0.030 
 [-0.049; 0.045] [-0.040; 0.044] [-0.038; 0.040] [-0.034; 0.034] 
Children 6-10 years old -0.046 0.065* 0.063* 0.081* 
 [-0.067; 0.066] [-0.063; 0.061] [-0.062; 0.061] [-0.051; 0.052] 
Boys 11-14 years old -0.002 -0.020 0.013 0.034* 
 [-0.036; 0.038] [-0.034; 0.035] [-0.031; 0.031] [-0.027; 0.027] 
Girls 11-14 years old -0.053* -0.007 0.007 0.021 
 [-0.038; 0.036] [-0.037; 0.035] [-0.036; 0.033] [-0.028; 0.025] 
Boys 15-19 years old 0.044* -0.005 0.019 0.002 
 [-0.041; 0.037] [-0.037; 0.038] [-0.036; 0.033] [-0.027; 0.027] 
Girls 15-19 years old -0.022 -0.035 0.005 -0.016 
 [-0.036; 0.035] [-0.038; 0.037] [-0.033; 0.033] [-0.027; 0.029] 
Men 20-34 years old 0.026 0.008 0.022 0.019 
 [-0.037; 0.037] [-0.036; 0.034] [-0.036; 0.032] [-0.029; 0.030] 
Women 20-34 years old 0.006 -0.017 -0.019 0.011 
 [-0.038; 0.033] [-0.037; 0.036] [-0.034; 0.031] [-0.030; 0.030] 
Men 35-54 years old -0.053* -0.020 0.025 0.010 
 [-0.030; 0.030] [-0.029; 0.030] [-0.030; 0.029] [-0.028; 0.026] 
Women 35-54 years old -0.013 -0.015 0.021 -0.012 
 [-0.033; 0.030] [-0.032; 0.032] [-0.028; 0.030] [-0.027; 0.027] 
Men more than 55 years old 0.027* -0.017 -0.026* -0.028* 
 [-0.024; 0.025] [-0.025; 0.026] [-0.025; 0.026] [-0.025; 0.027] 
Women more than 55 years old 0.005 -0.016 -0.017 -0.040* 
 [-0.026; 0.028] [-0.026; 0.026] [-0.026; 0.026] [-0.028; 0.030] 
Notes: Bootstrap CIs in square brackets; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 5: Systematic Variation in Impacts 
 
Point estimate 
(Standard error) 
Nov. 98 Per Capita 
Consumption 
Nov. 99 Per Capita 
Consumption 
Treatment 76.742** 72.361** 
 (-26.225) (24.772) 
Treatment × Poverty score 0.062** 0.078*** 
 (-0.023) (0.021) 
Treatment × Village marginality index  91.780*** 34.394*** 
 (-10.581) (9.761) 
Treatment × Village marginality index × Poverty score  0.126*** 0.048** 
 (-0.016) (0.015) 
Treatment × Children less than 2 years old 2.181 -5.675 
 (-3.403) (3.160) 
Treatment × Children 3-5 years old 0.831 0.124 
 (-2.909) (2.736) 
Treatment × Children 6-10 years old 5.949 -0.853 
 (-3.183) (2.974) 
Treatment × Boys 11-14 years old 8.715* 1.336 
 (-4.066) (3.863) 
Treatment × Girls 11-14 years old 6.73 4.139 
 (-4.077) (3.780) 
Treatment × Boys 15-19 years old 1.707 -5.309 
 (-3.787) (3.545) 
Treatment × Girls 15-19 years old 8.620* 1.404 
 (-3.749) (3.509) 
Treatment × Men 20-34 years old 14.169*** 1.398 
 (-4.059) (3.888) 
Treatment × Women 20-34 years old 8.143 1.213 
 (-4.358) (3.971) 
Treatment × Men 35-54 years old 17.061** -0.681 
 (-5.778) (5.195) 
Treatment × Men 35-54 years old 2.835 -2.151 
 (-5.273) (5.173) 
Treatment × Men more than 55 years old 21.381** -7.142 
 (-8.046) (7.428) 
Treatment × Women more than 55 years old -13.012* -1.165 
 (-5.881) (5.678) 
Treatment × Log(Family size) -47.394* -7.392 
 (-18.857) (17.549) 
Treatment × Male head of household -3.526 11.583 
 (-8.695) (8.467) 
Treatment × Indigenous head of household 9.150* 8.119* 
 (-4.253) (3.986) 
Treatment × Head’s age 0.007 0.068 
 (-0.258) (0.247) 
Treatment × Head’s education (in years) 1.151 -0.700 
 (-0.874) (0.773) 
Treatment × Head is an agricultural worker 4.048 -0.954 
 (-4.21) (4.058) 
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R-squared 0.336 0.328 
F-statistic for the null that all interactions = 0 
(p-value) 
9.27 
(0.001) 
4.66 
(0.001) 
F-statistic for the null that all interactions except those 
involving the poverty score and the village marginality 
index = 0 (p-value) 
2.34 
(0.001) 1.94 
(0.008) 
N 16,464 14,430 
Note: Treatment =1 for treatment group observations, 0 otherwise. The specification also includes 
direct effects for all of the covariates that we interact with the treatment indicator. 
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Table 6: Estimates Including Systematic Impact Heterogeneity 
 
 Nov. 98 Per Capita 
Consumption 
Nov. 99 Per Capita 
Consumption 
Average untreated outcome  201.55 
(144.17) 
176.44 
(125.82) 
Average systematic impact 7.11 
(1.86) 
16.79 
(1.60) 
Systematic impact standard deviation 21.73 
(2.12) 
14.27 
(1.67) 
Fraction positive given systematic 
variation in impacts  
0.6075 
(0.0436) 
0.8998 
(0.0368) 
Lower-bound on the idiosyncratic 
impact standard deviation  
11.47 
(5.26) 
4.74 
(2.75) 
Upper-bound on the idiosyncratic 
impact standard deviation  222.62 
(4.17) 
 
190.66 
(3.25) 
Cutoff value for p=0.50 4.68 4.81 
Cutoff value for p=0.40 5.36 5.58 
Cutoff value for p=0.30 6.11 6.46 
Cutoff value for p=0.20 7.20 7.65 
Cutoff value for p=0.10 8.85 9.46 
Cutoff value for p=0.05 10.35 11.08 
Cutoff value for p=0.01 13.34 14.14 
Note: Cut-off values for the distribution of the idiosyncratic impact standard deviation 
statistic under the null of no idiosyncratic variance in impacts are constructed as 
described in the text and in Appendix B. 
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Table 7: Estimates from Random Coefficient Models 
 
 Nov. 1998 
Per Capita Consumption 
Nov. 1999 
Per Capita Consumption 
Impact standard deviation 
based on difference in 
variances (no interactions) 
53.17 
(12.89) 
[0.001] 
34.12 
(12.47) 
[0.006] 
Breusch-Pagan LM statistic 69.13 
[0.001] 
19.16 
[0.001] 
LR test statistic 75.01 
[0.001] 
20.92 
[0.001] 
Fraction with positive 
impact under normality  
0.5571 
(0.019) 
0.6998 
(0.0741) 
Systematic impact standard 
deviation  
21.73 
(2.12) 
[0.001] 
 14.27 
(1.67)  
[0.001] 
Idiosyncratic impact 
standard variation 
52.83 
(12.50) 
[0.001] 
34.47 
(12.73) 
[0.007] 
Total impact standard 
deviation (with interactions) 
57.73 
(12.64) 
[0.001] 
38.14 
(12.84) 
[0.003] 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses, the corresponding p-values 
appear in square brackets. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of Frechét-Höffding Bounding Distributions 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Impacts from Biddle et al. (2004) Pearson Family Procedure 
November 1998 Per Capita Consumption 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Impacts from Biddle et al. (2004) Pearson Family Procedure 
November 1999 Per Capita Consumption 
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